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THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ AND THE ANALYSIS UNDER
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
every individual the right to speak freely,' meaning that the government
cannot impose restrictions on a person's right to speak unless they have
compelling reasons. Often, the government provides financial funding to
certain individuals or groups who will then convey a governmental mes-
sage. Yet, when the government provides subsidies or grants to particular
individuals, groups or corporations, First Amendment principles are of-
ten at odds. On one hand, the government has the right to delineate the
scope of their grant programs and can require grant recipients to abide by
certain conditions or restrictions.2 Yet, these conditions are unconstitu-
tional if they penalize individuals for exercising their constitutional
rights.'
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,' the United States Supreme
Court had to decide whether a federal grant program was unconstitu-
tional because it restricted the legal arguments government-funded attor-
neys could assert on behalf of their indigent clients.' In holding that the
restriction was unconstitutional, the Court failed to follow traditional
unconstitutional conditions analysis and instead announced a novel the-
ory that the restriction distorted the attorney's role in the judicial system.'
Part I of this paper examines the formation of the Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC") and the restrictions that have been placed on this
corporation.7 Part II discusses the legal precedent in government subsidy
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
2? See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (recognizing that the government may
define its programs); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(describing that when the government creates a limited public forum, certain restrictions may be
necessary to define the limits and purposes of the program).
3. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (acknowledging the
exercise of constitutional rights may not be a basis for refusing recipient benefits); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (forbidding the government from denying benefits based on
the exercise of constitutional rights, especially speech). This is called the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. See generally David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
4. 121 S. Ct. 1043(2001).
5. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1045.
6. Id. at 1050.
7. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
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cases.8 Part III describes the procedural posture and the Court's analysis
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.9 Part IV argues that the majority's
opinion did not follow established precedent and that the distortion prin-
ciple they announced is erroneous.'" In conclusion, Part V looks to the
future of government subsidy cases.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of The Legal Services Corporation
Congress created the private, nonprofit LSC when it enacted the Le-
gal Services Corporation Act of 1974." The LSC's purpose is to provide
"financial support for legal assistance in non-criminal proceedings or
matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance."' 2 The
LSC does not actually represent indigent clients but instead administers
grants to qualified local legal aid offices (called "grantees") rendering
free legal assistance to between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 indigent clients
annually."
Congress has placed significant restrictions on the scope of activities
in which LSC grantees may participate.'4 While President Carter
strengthened the LSC in the late 1970's, President Reagan's administra-
tion established many restrictions that were "designed to rein in the per-
8. See infra notes 25-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 59-104 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq. (2000).
12. Id. § 2996b(a). Furthermore, the Act states that:
[t]he Congress finds and declares that-
(1) there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for
individuals who seek redress of grievances;
(2) there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be
otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel and to continue the present vital legal
services program;
(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal
counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-
income persons consistent with the purposes of this chapter;
(4) for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our
government of laws; V
(5) to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the
influence of or use by it of political pressures; and
(6) attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the best
interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profession.
Id. §2996.
13. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 759 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Texas Rural
Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The LSC also ensures that the
grantees abide by the restrictions imposed by Congress. Id.
14. See Clifford M. Greene et al., Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734 (noting that the LSC Act prohibits LSC
offices from becoming involved in any form of political organizing or lobbying); Stephen K. Huber,
Thou Shalt not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of Legal Aid in America, 44 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 754 (1976) (describing the history of the LSC).
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ceived left-wing radicals allegedly in control of legal services programs
across the country."'" When Republicans gained the majority in Congress
in 1994, they again tried to dismantle the LSC but were ultimately vetoed
by President Clinton.'6 As a compromise, Congress agreed to retain the
LSC in exchange for the imposition of new restrictions on grantees.'7
Consequently, Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996 ("OCRAA")'8 which reduced LSC's
funding by thirty percent and established new restrictions on grantees.' 9
One such restriction was the so called "suit-for-benefits" exception.
B. The "Suit-for Benefits" Restriction
The "suit-for-benefits" restriction is found in section 504(a)(16) of
the OCRAA and prohibits LSC grantees from participating in "litigation
* . .involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system."'
Furthermore, LSC-funded attorneys may represent a client "who is
seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not in-
volve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law."2' If an
LSC-funded attorney determines that a client seeks to involve her in pro-
hibited litigation, the attorney must advise the client that she will be un-
able to accept the representation;' or if the litigation is underway, the
attorney must withdraw.23 Consequently, this restriction meant that LSC-
funded attorneys would continue to receive federal grants as long as they
did not challenge the validity of existing welfare law. The plaintiff-
respondents in Velazquez argued that this condition infringed their First
Amendment free speech rights."
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY CASES
When challenges are made to the constitutionality of restrictions
imposed on recipients of government subsidies, the Supreme Court has
traditionally relied on two competing doctrines: the right-privilege dis-
15. Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public Service in Illinois,
16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 7, 21 (1995).
16. See J. Dwight Yoder, Note: Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827,
834 (1998).
17. Id.
18. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (hereinafter
"OCRAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
19. See Megan E. Lewis, Note: Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services Corporation: The
Constitutionality of Defunding Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare System, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1178, 1178-1179 (1999).
20. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (2000).
21. Id. § 1639.4.
22. Petitioner's Opening Brief at I1, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001)
(Nos. 99-603, 99-960).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.9 (2000).
24. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 761 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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tinction and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.25 The right-privilege
distinction focuses on the inherent differences between constitutional
rights and privileges granted by the government." The doctrine is based
on the principle that because rights are Constitutional guarantees, the
government cannot restrict them unless its justification is compelling."
Privileges on the other hand are viewed more as a public charity and
"may be initially given to recipients on the condition that they surrender
or curtail the exercise of constitutional rights that they would otherwise
enjoy."" However, this doctrine has been severely criticized making the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine the primary analytical tool in gov-
ernment subsidy cases. 9
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine mandates that a govern-
ment-funded benefit may not obligate the recipient to surrender a con-
stitutional right, even if the government could have withheld that benefit
altogether." For example, in Speiser v. Randall,3 a California law condi-
tioned the receipt of veteran property tax exemptions on the individual's
signing a declaration disavowing a belief in overthrowing the govern-
ment by force or violence." In holding this law unconstitutional, the
Court said: "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.""
However, the Court has inconsistently applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in government subsidy cases making its understand-
ing and application perplexing." According to one commentator, ana-
25. Yoder, supra note 16, at 845. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 69, 72 (1982) (arguing that despite its reported demise, the right-privilege distinction is alive
and well and is an important principle in constitutional law).
26. Yoder, supra note 16, at 845.
27. Jdat 845-46.
28. Smolla, supra note 25, at 72 (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 80
(1947)). See also McAuliffe v . New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) ("The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.").
29. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (criticizing the right-privilege
distinction and endorsing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). But see Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (1964) (criticizing the right-privilege doctrine and arguing that
the distinction is an anachronism in an era where people depend on government for so much that is
essential to survival); see also Charles A Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) (arguing that government benefits "are no longer
regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense
a form of charity.").
30. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1415.
31. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
32. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 514-15.
33. Id. at 518. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that "if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the government to produce a result which it could not command directly.").
34. See e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983)
(refusing to follow the doctrine and upholding a federal tax law provision that conditioned tax
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lyzing the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on government funded
grantees is particularly difficult because:
It renders uncertain the status of speakers, forcing us to determine
whether speakers should be characterized as independent participants
in the formation of public opinion or instead as instrumentalities of
the government. And it renders uncertain the status of government
action, forcing us to determine whether subsidies should be charac-
terized as government regulations imposed on persons or instead as a
form of government participation in the marketplace of ideas."
Accordingly, the analysis must begin by determining the nature of
the relationship between the government and the restricted grantee."
When the government provides funding to governmental speakers, "the
unconstitutional conditions analysis is more deferential to the govern-
ment because the state is considered a participant in the public discourse
and, therefore, has the ability to organize its resources in such a way to
achieve its goals."37 However, when private speakers are the funding re-
cipients, the analysis is similar to that applied when no governmental
subsidies are involved. 8
The Court's determination of this relationship has resulted in out-
comes that are difficult to reconcile with one another. For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan,39 the government chose to subsidize doctors conducting
family planning counseling on the condition that they did not "encour-
age, promote, or advocate abortion as a method of family planning."
The Court held that the government's use of private speakers to convey a
government message amounted to governmental speech."
exempt status on the prerequisite that the organization not participate in lobbying or partisan political
activities and explaining that "Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated
any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for [Taxation with
Representation's] lobbying."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (refusing to apply the
doctrine explaining that
[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.)
For discussions and analysis explaining why the doctrine is confusing, see Yoder, supra note 16, at
854-60; Sulli'an, supra note 3, at 1417-20; Lewis, supra note 19, at 1182-91; Cole, supra note 3, at
682-702.
35. Robert C. Post, Essay: Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 152 (1996).
36. Id. at 155 (explaining that understanding this relationship is critical because "substantive
First Amendment analysis will depend on whether the citizen who speaks is characterized as a public
functionary or as an independent participant in public discourse.").
37. Yoder, supra note 16, at 849.
38. See Post supra note 35, at 152-54 (explaining that the analysis is similar to that described
in the text accompanying notes 48-57 infra).
39. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
40. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
41. Id. at 193.
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Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,"2
the state made a choice regarding what student organizations would re-
ceive government funding."3 Yet, in Rosenberger the choice was held to
be unconstitutional because:
[In Rust], the government did not create a program to encourage pri-
vate speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific in-
formation pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when
the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the gov-
ernment disburses public funds to private entities to convey a gov-
ernmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.
It does not follow, however.... that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize trans-
mittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage
diversity of views from private speakers.44
Consequently, in both Rust and Rosenberger, the state "selectively
fund[ed] a program to encourage certain activities it believe[d] to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative pro-
gram which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. '5 Yet, in
Rust the speaker was considered a government actor, whereas in Rosen-
berger the speakers were private. Because both of these cases involve
governmental decisions concerning the allocation of federal subsidies,
the decisions are difficult to reconcile and have therefore caused confu-
sion regarding the proper analysis for determining the government-
recipient relationship.
Once this relationship is determined, the analysis follows traditional
free speech principles. ' Consequently, courts must examine the forum
where the speech occurs as well as the condition's neutrality and preci-
sion. 7
When the funding recipient is a private actor and not an agent of the
government, the government has created a limited public forum." When
the government establishes a limited public forum, it is not required to
allow persons to engage in all types of speech.4'9 However, restrictions on
speech must be content-neutral - meaning it cannot discriminate on the
42. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
43. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824-25.
44. Id. at 833-34 (citations omitted).
45. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
46. See Yoder, supra note 16, at 850.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 851. See also David A. Stoll, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport,
Injuring Nine: International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1271, 1271 (1993) (describing the public forum doctrine).
49. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001).
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basis of viewpoint 0 - and the restriction must be reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.'
On the other hand, where the funding recipient is an agent of the
government, no public forum is created and the government can impose
content-based restrictions on the recipient so long as the restrictions are
proportional to the government's funding52 and are related to the govern-
ment's message. 3
Finally, under "precision" analysis, the court will ensure that the
restrictions are not overbroad or vague. A restriction is unconstitution-
ally vague if a reasonable person cannot determine what speech is pro-
hibited and what is permitted." Furthermore, a restriction is overbroad if
it restricts speech that is otherwise protected.' Accordingly, restrictions
must be narrowly tailored so as to ensure clarity in what speech is pro-
hibited and limit the types of speech that are covered by the restriction to
only those that are absolutely necessary to achieve the government's
purpose.
As the above discussion shows, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is confusing because of the Court's inconsistent application. The
decisions seem to indicate that if the Court wants to uphold a restriction,
it determines that the government is making a legitimate choice to fund
one activity and not others.7 On the other hand, if the Court wants to
strike down a restriction, it determines that the speaker is a private actor
and the government is unconstitutionally conditioning their free speech
rights. In Velazquez, the Court had the opportunity to define the pa-
rameters of the doctrine thereby clarifying its meaning. However, as dis-
cussed in Part IV, the Court utterly failed to take advantage of this op-
portunity and instead announced a novel rationale for its decision.
50. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); Nicole B.
Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination,
64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 512 (2000) (defining "viewpoint" to mean "expression representing a
particular perspective by a speaker or class of speakers.").
51. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
52. In other words, "the government must allow for adequate alternative channels for
engaging in restricted speech or activities using nongovernment funds." Yoder, supra note 16, at
854.
53. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991).
54. See Yoder, supra note 16, at 851.
55. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
58. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).
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III. THE VELAZQUEZ DECISION
A. Procedural Posture
LSC-funded attorneys from New York City, along with private LSC
contributors, and state and local officials who donated to LSC grantees
("respondents") filed suit against the LSC 9 ("petitioners") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The respon-
dents sought a preliminary injunction alleging that the "suit-for-benefits"
restriction violated their rights under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. ' The district court denied the respondents' motion
holding that the regulation was appropriately tailored to the govern-
ment's legitimate interests and it permitted adequate channels for re-
spondents to conduct restricted activities.6 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed stating that because the "suit-for-benefits" restriction allows the
distribution of funds to those who represent clients who will not chal-
lenge the existing rules of law, but denies funding to those who will
challenge existing rules, the provision "clearly seeks to discourage chal-
lenges to the status quo," and is therefore an impermissible viewpoint-
based restriction on expression.62 The LSC, challenging the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that the restriction was unconstitutional, filed a petition
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which the Court
granted.63
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by four other Justices,' delivered the opin-
ion of the Court which affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. The
Court's analysis began by examining the government-recipient relation-
ship.' It recognized that the rationale for allowing the government lati-
tude to restrict speech when the speech delivers the government's mes-
sage is based on the fact that the government is accountable to the elec-
torate and if the restriction is unpopular, newly elected government offi-
cials can promote a different message.' However, this rationale does not
59. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001). The United States Government
intervenened as a defendant in this case.
60. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F.Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The plaintiffs
also challengenged several other restrictions enumerated in the 1996 Act, but since the issue before
the Supreme Court only dealt with the "suit-for-benefits" restriction, the challenges to these other
restrictions are beyond the scope of this paper.
61. Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 326-27.
62. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 769-70 (2nd Cir. 1999).
63. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 529 U.S. 1052 (2000).
64. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer joined the majority opinion).
65. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1053.
66. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
67. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1048-49 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 235 (2000)).
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apply when the speech is private. ' Here, like the program at issue in Ro-
senberger,' the LSC program promoted private speech rather than gov-
ernmental speech;' when a lawyer argues on behalf of his client, this
cannot be considered government speech.7'
With the government-recipient relationship established, the Court
then discussed forum.72 Because this case involved a subsidy, limited
forum cases73 were not controlling but did provide guidance. ' Here, the
limitation foreclosed alternative forums of expression because LSC law-
yers could not undertake representation of a particular client if the cli-
ent's case would question the validity of current welfare laws." The
premise behind the LSC program is to provide legal representation "to
persons financially unable to afford legal assistance." 6 Therefore, in
cases where the LSC attorney must withdraw, the indigent client will be
unlikely to find another attorney, and will therefore not have another
source from which they can receive legal assistance pertaining to their
constitutional challenge to welfare laws.'
Consequently, by not allowing LSC attorneys to advise or advocate
for their clients concerning the validity of a particular welfare statute, the
"suit-for-benefits" restriction altered the traditional role these attorneys
play in the legal system." As Justice Kennedy explained, "[b]y seeking to
prohibit the [federally funded] analysis of certain legal issues and to
truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits
speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper
68. Id. at 1049 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
69. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995) (discussing
subsidies to student organizations).
70. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1049. According to the majority, this was the critical
distinction between this case and Rust. The Rust Court held that the speech at issue there was
governmental speech because the government was using private speakers to promote a governmental
message. Here, however, the advice an attorney gives to her client and the arguments the attorney
makes to the court cannot be classified as governmental speech. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
73. See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(establishing three types of government property: public forums, limited public forums, and non-
public forums); see also, Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-
394 (1993) (holding that once the school district chose to open its facilities to community groups it
could not discriminate against those engaging in religious speech unless strict scrutiny was met).
74. These cases are not controlling because by granting a subsidy, the government has merely
made choices about how to spend its money; it has not created a forum in the true sense of the word.
See generally Yoder, supra note 16.
75. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1050.
76. Id. at 1051. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2996(a)(3)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1050. The Court stated "[b]y providing subsidies to LSC, the Government seeks to
facilitate suits for benefits by using the State and Federal courts and the independent bar on which
those courts depend for the proper performance of their duties and responsibilities." Id. Therefore,
by restricting the arguments LSC-funded attorneys can make, the program distorts this critical
relationship. Id.
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exercise of the judicial power.""9 In other words, because the LSC attor-
neys are unable to represent their clients zealously, there may be incom-
plete analysis in certain cases that will cause the public to question the
sufficiency and integrity of the judicial system."
This, in turn, raises separation of powers concerns because Congress
has tried to insulate Congressional welfare legislation from judicial re-
view." Justice Kennedy explained, "[tihe statute is an attempt to draw
lines around the LSC program to exclude from litigation those arguments
and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature are
within the province of the courts to consider." 2 However, as was estab-
lished in Marbury v. Madison, "[i]t is emphatically the province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 3
Finally, Justice Kennedy rejected the petitioners' argument that the
"suit-for-benefits" restriction was necessary to define the scope of the
federal program. Since the effect of the restriction was to insulate wel-
fare laws from constitutional attack, the condition endangered the basic
principle that the First Amendment "'was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.""' Accordingly, the Constitution does not allow
Congress to suppress ideas that are thought to be adverse to the best in-
terests of the government, which is what Congress had done here.'
C. The Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, dissented." The dissent
initially pointed out that despite the majority's agreement that the "suit-
for-benefits" restriction did not directly regulate speech, did not create a
public forum, and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the
Court refused to apply traditional government subsidy analysis and in-
stead "applie[d] a novel and unsupportable interpretation of [the Court's]
public-forum precedents."8 The dissent argued that Rust was controlling
and that the majority's attempts to distinguish that case were misguided.'
79. Id. at 1051.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1052.
82. Id. at 1051.
83. Id. at 1050 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
84. Id. at 1051.
85. Id. at 1052 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
86. Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983));
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
87. Id. at 1053 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Conner and Justice Thomas.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1058.
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Applying Rust's traditional government subsidy analysis, the dissent
argued the restriction was viewpoint neutral because LSC attorneys can-
not represent clients who seek to challenge welfare laws or clients who
seek to defend welfare laws.' Furthermore, the restriction does not fore-
close alternative sources of legal assistance because LSC lawyers can
express their opinions concerning the constitutional validity of a welfare
law and may refer the client to another non-LSC attorney who can pursue
the matter.9'
Moreover, because the LSC Act is a federal subsidy program rather
than a federal regulatory program, it does not directly restrict speech and
will only indirectly restrict speech if the program is "manipulated to have
a coercive effect on those who do not hold the subsidized position." 2
Proving coercion in a limited spending program that does not create a
public forum (like the LSC Act) "is virtually impossible, because simply
denying a subsidy does not coerce belief."3 Furthermore, the test for
unconstitutionality is "whether denial of the subsidy threatens to drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' If this threat does not
exist, "the Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a crimi-
nal penalty at stake." 5
Justice Scalia then attacked the majority's contention that the re-
striction distorts the usual functioning of an existing medium of expres-
sion.' He argued that this assertion was wrong on the law because there
was no precedent to support it; the three cases the majority cited never
mentioned this new principle.' He argued it was also wrong on the facts
90. Id. at 1053-54.
91. Id. at 1054.
92. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
93. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)).
94. Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998)).
95. Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment, 524 U.S. at 587, 588).
96. Id. at 1055.
97. Id. at 1056. One case the Court cited was Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va-, 515 U.S.
819 (1995). According to Justice Scalia, this case did not stand for the principle that the usual
functioning of student newspapers is to express many different points of view, "but rather that the
spending program itself had been created 'to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.'
What could not be distorted was the public forum that the spending program had created." Id.
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Justice Scalia argued
that Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), "discussed the nature of
television broadcasting, not to determinie whether government regulation would alter its usual
functioning and thus violate the First Amendment[, ... but rather to determine whether state-owned
television is a 'public forum' under our First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. (quoting Forbes, 523
U.S. at 673-74). Finally, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal. 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court
stated that "of course, the restriction on editorializing would plainly be valid if Congress were to
adopt a revised version of [the statute] that permitted [public radio] stations to establish affiliate
organizations which could then use the station's facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds." Id.
(quoting FCC, 468 U.S. at 400). Justice Scalia asserted that this is what occurred under the LSC Act
since the regulations allow grantees to establish affiliate organizations to represent clients on matters
that fall outside the scope of the LSC Act. Id.
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because there was no foundation for the assertion that because LSC at-
torneys cannot advise or argue concerning the validity of welfare laws,
this restriction distorts the function of the judicial system. 8 Justice Scalia
stated that it is not the function of the courts to inquire into the validity of
statutes in all cases." The courts must only focus on the issues presented
and argued by the parties, "and if the Government chooses not to subsi-
dize the presentation of [questions concerning the validity of statutes],
that in no way 'distorts' the courts' role.''1'
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's irrelevant concern that in
cases in which an LSC attorney must withdraw, the client will unlikely
obtain other counsel.'' This fact is irrelevant to Justice Scalia because the
client will be in "no worse condition than he would have been in had the
LSC program never been enacted."'0" Justice Scalia emphasized that the
Government is not required to provide welfare recipients with free legal
representation. 3 In other words, the LSC program is a government bene-
fit, not a Constitutional right. Therefore, "[iut is hard to see how provid-
ing free legal services to some welfare claimants (those whose claims do
not challenge the applicable statutes) while not providing it to others is
beyond the range of legitimate legislative choice."'" Accordingly, the
dissent would have found the "suit-for-benefits" restriction constitu-
tional.
IV. ANALYSIS
As previously mentioned, the Court's Velazquez analysis could have
gone a long way towards clarifying the analytical framework courts
should apply under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. For exam-
ple, the Court could have elaborated on the characteristics that make a
recipient of federal funds a government speaker rather than a private
speaker. Instead, without clearly explaining its rationale, the Court ap-
plied a fact specific analysis and simply carved out a niche of non-
governmental speech for advice and advocacy given to a client by an
attorney.'5 This means that courts will continue to guess regarding the
appropriate nexus needed to make speech governmental - ultimately




101. Id. at 1057.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Id. The majority also conceded this point but argued that the scope of the restriction was
unconstitutional because it insulated welfare laws from judicial review. See id. at 1052.
104. Id. The dissent also focused on the issue of severability which was decided by the Second
Circuit but which was not argued or briefed before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1058-60. This issue
is beyond the scope of this paper.
105. Id. at 1049.
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The Court's opinion was also erroneous in that it did not discuss
viewpoint discrimination. As the dissent emphasized, the "suit-for-
benefits" restriction is not viewpoint based because the restriction pro-
hibits litigation that either challenges or defends welfare laws.'" At most
the restriction is content-based discrimination because it prohibits all
forms of litigation dealing with the validity of the welfare system; in
other words, Congress was merely defining the scope of the LSC pro-
gram. As the Court stated in Rosenberger, "in determining whether the
State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the
exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinc-
tion between ... content discrimination, which may be permissible if it
preserves the purpose of that limited forum, and.., viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations."' 7 Here, the purpose of the
program is to provide "financial support for legal assistance in noncrimi-
nal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal
assistance."' 8 The purpose is not to create a forum for litigants to chal-
lenge the validity of welfare laws. Therefore, because the restriction pro-
hibits all litigation concerning welfare reform - pro or con - the restric-
tion is not viewpoint based.
Nonetheless, instead of following this traditional analytical frame-
work, the majority relied on the imprecise theory that the "suit-for-
benefits" restriction distorted the role of attorneys in the judicial system.
" Yet, the majority did not point to any proof that the restriction had in
fact distorted the attorney's role in any actual case. The Court simply
hypothesized that in cases where the LSC funded attorney must withdraw
from representation, "the client is unlikely to find other counsel."'' 0
However, this is simply wrong because as the dissent emphasized,
LSC-funded attorneys who must withdraw "are also free to express their
views of the legality of the welfare law to the client, and they may refer
the client to another attorney who can accept the representation.'""
Moreover, as LSC explained in its brief:
the regulations do not prohibit part-time employees of LSC grantees -
- including lawyers -- from participating in the restricted activities as
employees of non-LSC funded organizations.... [Additionally], full-
time employees of LSC-funded organizations are free to engage in
the restricted "advocacy" activities in their individual capacity, on
their own behalf, and on their own time. As a result, LSC-funded at-
torneys can express their personal opposition to existing welfare laws,
106. Id. at 1053-54.
107. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995). See also Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,103 S.Ct. 948, 955 (1983).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).
109. See supra notes 79-84.
110. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1054.
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and their personal views on welfare reform, as long as these unsubsi-
dized activities occur outside the LSC program."1
2
Therefore, if LSC-funded attorneys are unable to represent a client
on their own time, they are free to refer the client to an attorney who can
represent him. This referral should be effective since attorney ethical
rules encouraged at least fifty hours of pro-bono work per year."3 There-
fore, contrary to the majority's contention that the restriction leaves "no
alternative channel for expression,""' there are ample alternative outlets
for those who seek to challenge the validity of welfare laws - either
through LSC attorneys when they are working on their own time, or pri-
vate attorneys who accept the client's case pro-bono. Accordingly, "[t]he
[restriction] did not distort the traditional adversarial role of the lawyer;
it simply insisted that constitutional challenges or defenses of welfare
rules be undertaken by non-subsidized attorneys to leave more resources
for more routine non-constitutional welfare litigation in which courts
would still enjoy the final word.""' 5
Finally, the "suit-for-benefit" restriction was one of many restric-
tions intended to define the scope of the LSC program. Because the gov-
ernment is providing a subsidy that it does not have to grant, it should be
able to define the scope of that program by prohibiting activities that are
designed to defeat the welfare system that it is trying to promote. The
program was designed to provide equal access to the legal system for
those with insufficient means. The program was not designed to use tax
dollars to promote welfare litigation aimed at welfare reform. This type
112. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 11, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (Nos.
99-603, 99-960) (citations omitted).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2001). The American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 states:
A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per
year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority
of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of
limited means or (2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and
educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of
persons of limited means.
Furthermore, the issue of pro bono legal service has been the subject of considerable scholarly
discussion. See, e.g., Thomas Bradley, The Private Bar and the Public Lawyer: An Essential
Partnership, 4 NOVA L.J. 357 (1980) (advocates partnership of private bar and public lawyers to
help provide legal services to poor); The Honourable Mr. Justice Brian Dickson, The Public
Responsibilities of Lawyers, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 175 (1983) (discussion of pro bono responsibilities);
Stephen T. Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to Promote the Full
Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1987) (studies responsibility to make legal
aid available to poor in Florida); B. George Ballman, Jr., Note, Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move
towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That What We Want?, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1139 (Spring
1994) (traces history of pro bono and suggests that mandatory pro bono equates to involuntary
servitude, which courts choose to ignore in preference to benefits of mandatory pro bono).
114. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
115. Bruce Fein, Free Speech Don Quixote, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at A16 (Mr.
Fein is general counsel for the Center for Law and Accountability, a public interest law group
headquartered in Virginia).
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of activity should be left for the legislative branch because it is account-
able to the electorate.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's government subsidy cases have created tre-
mendous confusion and uncertainty. In Velazquez, the Court had the op-
portunity to clarify the appropriate analysis under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Instead of following traditional unconstitutional
conditions analysis, the Court announced the faulty distortion principle.
Because the government provides millions of dollars each year towards
subsidies and grants, the boundaries of what the government can and
cannot do need to be better defined.
Furthermore, as the Court correctly explained, the legislative branch
cannot pass laws and then forbid the judicial branch from examining
those laws because this would create a separation of powers problem.
However, as explained above, this problem does not exist under the LSC
program because there are several alternate forums from which chal-
lenges to welfare laws can originate.
In practice, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is superior to
the right-privilege distinction because the right-privilege distinction
gives the government too much power. The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is a check on the government ensuring that it does not unjusti-
fiably infringe the constitutional rights of individuals. Nonetheless, the
doctrine needs to be examined and explained so courts across the country
can understand what is prohibited and what is not. For the most part, the
Court avoided this task in the Velazquez case and instead applied an er-
roneous distortion doctrine. One can only hope that the next time the
Court has the opportunity to expound on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, it will not dodge its responsibility.
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